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Abstract 
 
India’s early radio development is considered in this paper as both a natural inheritor to 
those great modernising works of the 19th century (namely the railways, the postal 
service and the electric telegraph), but also as a heavily contested – and much debated – 
tool of modern 20th century mass communication. In the absence of early listener- 
accounts, the interweaving ‘radio stories’ of prominent broadcasters and administrators 
are brought to the fore both as a useful historical source on radio’s development, but 
also in an effort to understand the personal and institutional connections that persisted 
in the administration of the British Raj by the Government of India (New Delhi) and 
India Office (London). This paper also, though, exposes the power of individual 
personalities in advancing and or resisting radio’s progress during the inter-war years (c. 
1922-1940). Of particular note was the involvement of Sir John Reith (Director General 
of the BBC), Lord Birkenhead (Secretary of State for India) and, from 1935, Lionel 
Fielden (the Government of India’s first Director of Broadcasting) in promoting 
domestic Indian broadcasting – although with strong direction and influence from the 
BBC. 
 
Introduction 
 
 
India offers special opportunities for the development of broadcasting. Its distances and 
wide spaces alone make it a promising field. In India’s remote villages there are many who, after the 
days work is done, find time hangs nearly enough upon their hands, and there must be many officials 
and others whose duties carry them into out-of-the-way places where they crave for the company of their 
friends and the solace of human companionship. There are of course, too, in many households, 
those whom social custom debars from taking part in recreation outside their own 
homes. To all these and many more broadcasting will be a blessing and a boon of real 
value. Both for entertainment and for education its possibilities are great, and yet we 
perhaps scarcely realise how great they are. Broadcasting in India is today in its infancy, 
but I have little doubt that before many years are past, the numbers of its audience will have 
increased tenfold, and that this new application of science will have its devotees in every part of India.2 
 
 
As the electricity crackled through the capacitors and amplifiers of the Indian 
Broadcasting Company’s (IBC’s) Bombay transmitter station on 23rd July 1927 the 
collective achievement of almost a decade of experimental broadcasting in India was 
brought to a spectacular and momentous resolution. The Viceroy H.E. Lord Irwin, 
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addressing the gathered crowds and an expectant wireless audience, heralded this ‘new 
application of science’ as a blessing and a boon of real value to the far-flung populations 
who would be brought within earshot of the IBC’s output. Whether for education or 
entertainment, companionship or culture, Irwin anticipated a rapidly developing 
‘listenership’ and that before long – such were the ‘special’ geographical opportunities 
provided by the subcontinent’s scale and open spaces – ‘broadcasting’ would attract 
devotees in every part of India.  
 
As Irwin well understood, however, such technological innovations were not without 
precedent, and warnings from history. The development of the railway, the telegraph 
and uniform postage during the 1850s may have instituted India’s ‘nineteenth century 
communications revolution’, but it had also helped spark the touch-paper of early 
Indian nationalisms; the improved state of transport and communications allowing 
latent ideas and attitudes to travel and ferment into broader political movements.3 
Although the telegraph and the railways had proven their tactical worth in re-
establishing British authority following the Sepoy Uprising4, the legacy of such 
modernising initiatives did not provide the most (geo)politically compelling incentive 
for further technological developments, particularly on the 70th anniversary of the 1857 
uprising (in 1927), and at a moment when anti-colonial sentiment was finding new focus 
under the charismatic and media-aware leadership of M.K. Gandhi.5 
 
Perhaps, then, the inauguration of the Bombay wireless station denoted a recognition 
and acknowledgment within the colonial administration that radio broadcasting could 
act as a potential salve to India’s internal political divisions. After all, broadcasting 
experiences from Europe and the imperial metropole were already appearing to show 
the way in this regard, and it was surely just a matter of time before India followed suit. 
As Partha Sarathi Gupta has recently recognised;  
 
Monopolistic control of information strengthens the authority of those in power, and 
one would expect a colonial state [i.e. British India] to make the most of this device. In 
the 1920s the Indian scene was characterised by social unrest and political agitation. 
Europe showed that the broadcasting medium could be used by Fascist Italy to 
manufacture an illusion of political consensus and by the Soviet Union to broadcast 
revolutionary messages through the length and breadth of the former Tsarist Empire. In 
Britain itself radio came to the aid of the ruling circles during the nine-day General 
Strike in May 1926.6 
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In colonial India the political opportunities for this new wireless medium were 
unquestionably considerable, if not always immediately obvious (or 
politically/economically expedient) to the key decision makers in London and New 
Delhi. As a result, the early adventure of Indian broadcasting was, in reality, rather less 
straightforward than any such international lessons might suggest. Even the vision of 
wireless’ future put forward in the Viceroy’s speech would prove somewhat wide of the 
eventual mark. Indeed, looking back to the advent of the wireless broadcasting medium 
in India (and its reception by the public and the Imperial authorities) we are confronted 
with a distinctly turbulent early history; filled with moments of great technological 
promise and geopolitical opportunity followed by long periods of political and financial 
neglect, widespread mistrust (and misunderstanding), and an undercurrent of ‘official’ 
scepticism. This was in marked distinction to many of those early broadcasting 
experiences being played out elsewhere around the emerging wireless world; India’s radio 
story ultimately deferring from British, European and colonial ‘models’ of broadcasting 
development during the 1920s/30s as a very particular set of geographic, political, social 
and economic conditions began to deflect radio’s growth in the subcontinent away from 
its earlier, much-anticipated, course. 
 
This paper, then, examines the period of early radio development in India between the 
wars and sets the emergence of an Indian wireless broadcasting system not only within 
the context of 1920s/1930s British India and anti-colonial agitation, but also within the 
burgeoning – and hotly contested – ‘international broadcasting’ environment. It also 
seeks to explore the series of relationships that emerged between the Government of 
India (New Delhi/Simla), the India Office (London) and the BBC during this pre-
Independence era in an effort to elucidate and better understand the ‘real’ (direct, 
political, personal and institutional interactions) and, what we might call, ‘ethereal’ 
connections (more indirect, broadcaster-listener exchanges) that, together, shaped BBC-
Indian relations prior to 1947. Thus, it is not assumed that radio broadcasting and 
listening were simply tools of imperial domination, rather this intervention highlights 
the contingent nature of radio development.  The information presented here has been 
drawn from unpublished primary materials held within the archives of the BBC and the 
India Office in London, and from the Government of India papers within the National 
Archive of India (New Delhi). Secondary material, including published diaries and 
government reports, from the period have also been used, as has more recent historical 
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research on the cultural and political history of British rule in India, with particular 
reference to the role of communications. 
 
Broadcast Pioneers: radio enthusiasm and the emergence of the IBC 
 
The IBC’s ceremonial inauguration is generally considered to mark the naissance of 
organised broadcasting in India, and came only a matter of months after the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was awarded its first charter to provide public service 
programming across the UK by the British government.7 As Gupta (2002) has noted 
(despite somewhat divergent future paths), “the beginnings of broadcasting in India and 
Britain were almost contemporaneous”.8 Gupta’s point here, though, doesn’t simply 
relate to the formal institutional arrangements that were being realised in early-mid 
1927, but reflects the fact that indigenous Indian radio enthusiasts had been 
energetically testing wireless technologies since the early 1920s – at a time when 
dedicated radio engineers in the UK (the Marconi Co., in particular) were themselves 
still grappling with designing and building the most rudimentary of transmission 
systems.9 
 
In India this early interest in radio was being driven largely by the ‘Radio Clubs’ that had 
formed in the large urban centres of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, through which 
educated and enthusiastic amateurs – backed by the financial instincts of both 
indigenous Indian and European (British) entrepreneurs – sought a rather more 
‘collective’ approach to the design and application of broadcasting technologies.10 The 
Bombay Presidency Radio Club was an early leader in this field thanks in large part to 
the efforts of Giachand Motwane, one of the Club’s founding members, who is widely 
credited with having made the first recorded (i.e. ‘noted’) radio transmission in India, 
during 1920.11 This was soon followed by commercially funded broadcasting 
experiments by the Times of India newspaper and Bombay’s Post & Telegraph (P&T) 
Office during the summer of 1921.12 In West Bengal, meanwhile, Britain’s Marconi 
Company, Ltd. had started transmitter trials and experimental broadcasts from sites 
across Calcutta. They reported incremental successes:  
 
The first concert programme was heard at a distance of 3 miles, and subsequently a 
discourse from the local golf course was heard at a distance of 72 miles.13 
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Further experimental systems were recorded in Bangalore, Hyderabad and, again, in 
Bombay where several rival stations had been established, and fairly rapidly closed, 
during the early-1920s.14 To observers in Britain the state of Indian broadcasting by the 
mid-1920s was beginning to look rather haphazard, and was provoking murmurs of 
dissatisfaction in London broadcasting circles. John Reith, General Manager of British 
Broadcasting Company, lobbied the India Office on the issue as early as March 1924 by 
advocating the potential benefits of the burgeoning ‘British model’  (i.e. centralised, 
licensed monopoly) in transforming the Indian subcontinent: 
 
The erection of broadcasting stations would provide a connecting link between all parts 
of the Indian Empire, bringing the most remote outlying districts into close touch with 
principal cities.”15 
 
As Reith (1949) later noted in his autobiography Into the Wind, this appeal to the India 
Office (and a subsequent appeal to the Viceroy in 1925) was, as far as he could tell, 
“without effect”, despite evidence that anti-colonial sentiment in British India was 
mounting in a very public manner – as witnessed by nationalist protests which coincided 
with the royal tour of Edward, Prince of Wales, between 1921-1922.16  
 
By 1926, while there was the tacit acknowledgement within the GoI for the need to 
formalise the systems and structures of broadcasting, Reith’s call for a “public service” 
model (on the lines of a post-Crawford Committee BBC) had been roundly criticised 
and shelved.17 In its place, the GoI in New Delhi – guided by the ‘Retrenchment 
Committee’ (which sought to reduce post-War governmental spending) and influential 
financial officers such as Sir Basil Blackett and Charles Innes (Commerce Member) – 
settled on a less interventionist approach to the broadcasting question, proposing 
instead to support an application for a commercial broadcasting licence (on a monopoly 
basis) by the recently-formed Indian Broadcasting Company (IBC).18 
 
This decision confirmed Reith’s suspicions that his direct petitioning of the India Office 
and GoI (via the Viceroy) over the previous years had little effect.19 And yet, in reality, 
the announcement of the GoI’s decision seems to have provoked a guised reassessment 
of Reith’s plan within India Office in London – not least by the Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Birkenhead. Shortly after receiving confirmation of the IBC plan 
Birkenhead wrote privately to the Viceroy on the subject of ‘broadcasting in India’. 
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Invoking Reith’s proposed benefits of a widespread broadcasting network connecting 
“all parts of the Indian Empire”20, Birkenhead questioned the IBC’s proposals:  
 
Though we can hardly expect in India anything like the phenomenal growth of 
broadcasting that has taken place in this country in the last few years; there seems no 
reason why it should not advance fairly rapidly, and if properly handled might eventually 
have a profound effect in a country where means of wide and rapid dissemination of 
news are now so limited. If broadcasting can be made to reach the villager in his own language, the 
assistance which would be afforded to Government, provided a proper control over the programme is 
exercised, in spreading accurate information and combating dangerous unfounded rumours would be 
great. 
 
So far as I can judge, the Company to which a monopoly has been given for five years 
intends to do business with the English speaking population, that is to say Europeans 
and the educated Indians of the cities. Their installations at Bombay and Calcutta, each 
with a radius of 1,000 miles, will hardly touch the northern part of the Punjab or any 
part of the Frontier Province…The man who we wish to reach is not so much the 
resident in the city as the inhabitant of the small town and large village. He is the man 
who is most behind in knowledge of events and most liable to be misled; at the same 
time he is the man on whom a good influence would have the greatest result. In cities 
English is so widely spoken that the same installation could be used for both a 
European and a vernacular programme as the hours during which these would be most 
suitable would not be likely to clash. But there must be, in order to secure effective and 
intelligible production in the vernacular, a separate station for each important vernacular 
language.21 
 
This was a highly significant intervention, not least because it suggested a potential rift 
(however well mannered) between the India Office and the GoI on the future of 
broadcasting in the subcontinent. There were clear concerns in London that the 
proposed system of commercial broadcasting would fail to reach the very people who, 
in the opinion of the India Office, needed to be contacted most; in particular India’s 
rural populations and the Hindi, Urdu and Bengali-speaking inhabitants of the main 
cities. Far from being a call for vernacular education and or entertainment, Birkenhead’s 
interventions were being driven by, what appears to have been, growing sensitivities 
within the India Office to the potential strategic and geopolitical value/influence of 
radio across British India, and in the most remote Frontier Provinces in particular.22 It is 
interesting to note that this came only a matter of months after the general strike in 
Britain (3rd-12th May 1926), when the BBC had shown its versatility and immediacy 
(particularly by comparison with Churchill’s British Gazette) during the associated 
disorder. Churchill had even called on the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, to 
commandeer the BBC.23 While this was rejected (an act that Churchill is said to have 
described as “monstrous”), the TUC and Opposition leadership, including Ramsay 
MacDonald, remained conspicuously absent from the BBC airwaves.24 As Secretary of 
State for India, Birkenhead was present at Cabinet (as was an invited John Reith) to hear 
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Churchill’s outburst – and it seemed to make a lasting impression.25 The final paragraph 
of Birkenhead’s correspondence provokes a clear sense of urgency in tackling this issue: 
 
I imagine that to establish a custom of the use of receivers with loud speakers for the 
benefit of assembled villagers, it would be necessary at the outset for Government and 
the Company in association to send round a small travelling staff with receivers to tour 
some of the more important villages in each district. I am convinced that immense 
possibilities lie behind these suggestions. I beg of you to give them your earnest and personal 
attention.26 
 
Irwin’s reply (dated 9th September) rather downplays Birkenhead’s chief concerns, 
offering only an air of concordance on the “general importance” of Indian broadcasting, 
while providing a more pointed reminder that, “up to the present day the policy of the 
Government has been to leave broadcasting to develop naturally under private 
enterprise”.27 As Irwin continued, however: 
 
We are…fully alive to the fact that if progress in India is in any way to resemble that in 
the United Kingdom, it will have to be considered whether Government should take a 
more active part…Our two great difficulties will be: - 
 
1. The multiplicity of languages, and 
2. The cost of receiving sets, which are beyond the means of the ordinary 
peasant. Neither difficulty, I think, ought to be insuperable.28 
 
Nonetheless, despite these apparent concessions from the Viceroy on 9th September, 
there is no evidence of their subsequent translation into affirmative action with regard 
to the IBC-policy and or remit. When the joint GoI-IBC agreement was signed on 13th 
September – only four days after the Viceroy’s correspondence with the Secretary of 
State for India – there was little trace of Birkenhead’s suggested innovations: 
 
Under its terms of agreement with the Government of India – which were concluded 
on 13 September 1926 – the company undertook to be and remain a genuine Indian 
company, install and work within nine months, efficient broadcasting stations in 
Bombay and Calcutta, expand the service, if commercially practicable, and allow any 
bona fide importer of wireless apparatus to be a member of the company. In return, the 
government gave it a five-year monopoly and promised to pay it 80% of all licence fees 
received on account of wireless stations in British India (excluding Burma) from the 
date the broadcasting service started.29 
 
Despite his clear disappointment in the arrangement, John Reith still sought to influence 
the direction of the IBC. As he later recalled, “On its [the IBC’s] chairman and others 
concerned, I tried to impress the heavy public service obligations”.30 Reith was also 
happy to nominate a chief executive (Eric Dunstan) to oversee the running of the new 
institution. Although Dunstan wouldn’t arrive in India until December 1926, the effects 
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of the IBC’s launch were swift to be felt as the commercial backers became hungry for 
financial returns. The reign of India’s amateur ‘Radio Clubs’ was brought to a 
resounding end as the IBC, buoyed by the prospect of revenue generated from the sale 
of radio licences (in a pseudo-BBC mould), exercised the rights and privileges (and 
authority) granted to it under the terms of its five-year broadcasting agreement.31  
 
Notwishstanding this potentially lucrative agreement, the GoI and IBC had conspired to 
create a financial and operational disaster. It took almost 12 months to construct the 
company’s first operational transmitting stations in Bombay and Calcutta; much longer 
than first anticipated, and with considerable fiscal implications.32 The company was also 
seriously undercapitalised. As Eric Dunstan, the former BBC employee who had been 
selected to take charge of Indian broadcasting, recognised during the summer of 1927 
(only 6 months after arriving in India to take up his position): 
 
£42,000 was a dangerously small sum to start on especially when the estimates – to 
which I suppose one must always add 25 per cent – show a capital expenditure of 
£21,000 and running expenses at the rate of nearly £28,000 a year for the two stations. 
No provision was apparently taken into consideration of the running expenses of those 
months which must precede actual broadcasting or for such heavy items as staff passage 
to India.”33 
 
To make matters worse, by the years-end of 1927 only 3594 radio licences had been 
issued.34 India’s physical geography, too, – considered by Irwin to be the basis of 
broadcasting’s ‘special opportunities’ in the subcontinent – worked against the IBC’s 
commercial development. Geographical distances in India were vast, while enormous 
swathes of the country’s interior, although supporting a large net population, could only 
do so at very low density. Even in the villages and towns technological limitations 
proved daunting for potential subscribers and listeners: 
 
The questions of how radio would be powered, and how to pay for expensive facilities 
and expertise, all of which would have to be imported, were sufficient discouragement 
to most. Those who did entertain the possibilities often resorted to the fanciful. One 
government official speculates that radio could be powered in the villages by a peon 
cranking a handle, or pedalling on a stationary bicycle frame, or a bullock-drawn water 
wheel.35 
 
Combined, these inescapable realities of the Indian geographical and demographic 
landscape left an increasingly costly wireless network without the subscriber-base 
needed to achieve a necessary financial return. This was a very different set of 
circumstances to those being experienced in Britain and continental Europe. The British 
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Broadcasting Company, for example, which operated under a similar commercial 
monopoly agreement between 1922-1926 expanded much more rapidly across the UK 
during its early infancy. Within 4 years, the BBC had built transmitting and relay stations 
to cover every major urban area in the country and had secured 2.5 million annual 
subscribers.36 By comparison, in January 1930 – almost 3 years into its broadcasting 
agreement – the IBC had opened only two small transmitting stations (each with a 
radius of c. 30 miles) and had registered fewer than 8,000 licence holders.37 
 
The IBC’s broadcasts suffered both in terms of ‘range’ and ‘reach’. While the costs of 
expanding wireless networks beyond the urban centres of Bombay and Calcutta was 
prohibitively expensive, the root of the problem lay in the IBC’s failure to achieve and 
consolidate sustainable audiences (i.e. an ample ‘reach’) in those spaces where their 
transmissions were already audible.38 As Lord Birkenhead had highlighted in his letter of 
15th July 1926, the IBC only planned to speak to the “English speaking population, that 
is to say Europeans and the educated Indians of the cities”.39 In other words, as 
Manjunath Pendakur (2003) has recognised of the IBC’s situation; 
 
…by 1930 their [the IBC’s] pioneering effort to launch privately owned radio ran into 
trouble because of a lack of revenues. Broadcasting from their two stations, located in 
Bombay and Calcutta, they catered to the small European community and Westernised 
Indians while ignoring the masses.40 
 
This neglect was to prove a costly (if not unforeseen) error of judgement. By February 
1930 the IBC’s finances had reached crisis-point, forcing the company into liquidation 
on 1st March 1930. Indian broadcasting, after less than four years of centralised 
operation, was officially bankrupt. 
 
In a notable, and rather uncharacteristic, turn of speed, the GoI agreed to meet the 
costs of the liquidation process. Even more noteworthy was the announcement almost 
one month later that the GoI had decided to purchase the assets of the IBC, which were 
to be placed under the control of the Department of Industry and Labour.41 This may 
simply have been a kind-hearted bailout plan for the affected shareholders, but what is 
certain is that this represented a major and dramatic shift in government policy which, 
for almost a decade, had been primarily concerned with reducing government 
expenditure under the terms of the post-War Entrenchment Committee.42 Nevertheless, 
the IBC’s new status as a branch of government necessitated a change in the 
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organisation’s public identity; its name stripped of commercial overtones and replaced 
with a designation more in tune with the Reithian notions (prevailing in Britain) of 
broadcasting as a ‘public service’.  
 
The Indian State Broadcasting Service (ISBS) was inaugurated within the Department of 
Industry and Labour on 1st April 1930, and yet despite this latest manoeuvre Indian 
broadcasting seemed to be stuck at the organisational starting block. This was certainly 
the opinion within British broadcasting circles where the BBC’s founding Director-
General, John Reith, anguished over the lack of direction and support afforded to issue 
of broadcasting in India.43 From as early as 1923/4 (as we already have seen), Reith had 
been active in his attempts to persuade the GoI and successive Viceroys of the merits of 
public service broadcasting within (and to) the subcontinent. He was sensitive both to 
the pressures and requirements of a commercial broadcasting enterprise such as the IBC 
(having been the General Manager of the British Broadcasting Company before 
Incorporation in 1926), but as the BBC’s Director-General Reith was increasingly aware 
of the political potency of those new broadcasting specimens being heard in continental 
Europe. In a resurgent Germany, in Italy, and in the Soviet Union, radio as a medium 
was becoming deeply implicated in the structures of state power and propaganda.44 
 
With the intensification of Gandhi’s ‘Civil Disobedience movement’ during 1930 there 
seemed to be an opportunity for the government to utilise the newly redesignated ISBS 
in the service of Indian state consolidation and political unity. And yet, despite Reith’s 
ongoing efforts, and the increasingly apparent potentialities of the ISBS, Indian 
broadcasting continued to languish in a state of subdued inactivity. The events of early-
1930 seem to have dented the wiser public (i.e. British Indian) belief in wireless 
broadcasting as a sustainable medium – a mood reflected in the number of radio 
licences in force which declined for the first time since 1927.45 With the deepening 
global economic crisis (after 1929) and the deflationary policies being pursued by the 
GoI, the Department of Industry and Labour also appeared to lose faith in the future of 
wireless broadcasting, announcing the ISBS’s ‘imminent closure’ on 9th October, 193146. 
Radio, again, seemed to have failed in exploiting its (much vaunted) ‘special 
opportunities’ with regard to unifying British India, and appeared fated to failure. 
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In Britain the news of ISBS’s closure was received with considerable consternation. The 
Federation of British Industry were worried, in particular, by associated rumours that 
the radio stations of Bombay and Calcutta might be sold to foreign – in all likelihood, 
American – commercial interests47. Fearing the loss of the still potentially lucrative 
Indian market to British wireless manufacturers (none of whom had shown much 
interest in 1928 following Reith’s intervention), the Federation lobbied the India Office 
throughout the winter of 1931 to reconsider the reported sell-off. The campaign seemed 
to work and the future of Indian broadcasting was again placed ‘under review’.48 
 
By 23rd November 1931 it had been decided that broadcasting should be allowed to 
continue, for an interim period, for evaluation. Whilst this was certainly no great 
mandate for broadcasting’s future, the period of review did seem to consolidate the 
ISBS’s position in the minds of listeners and subscribers; wireless receiver licences 
broke through the 8,000 barrier for the first time in December. Within a year, a further 
although still distinctly modest, increase had brought total subscriptions up to 8557.49 
These were still meagre figures, particularly by comparison with the BBC’s experience in 
the United Kingdom, which had achieved 10,000-plus subscriptions in its first 3 months 
of broadcasting.50 By late-December 1932 there seemed to be a change in fortune for 
the ISBS which, significantly, had rather less to do with interventions from the GoI than 
a broader paradigm shift in the broadcasting landscape of India, and, indeed, the British 
Empire as a whole. As Lionel Fielden (1940) reported the event in his official account 
of the Progress of Broadcasting in India: 
 
‘In 1932-33…there was a sudden improvement [in licensed listeners], the total at the 
end of 1933 being 10.872 and at the end of 1934, 16179. During the period 1932-34 
there was no appreciable difference in the output or quality of programmes radiated by 
the Bombay and Calcutta Stations, nor was there any increase in their range. The sudden 
increase from 8,000 to 16,000 licences during this period must, therefore, be attributed 
to another factor, namely, the opening of the BBC’s Empire Service in 1932 (December 
19th) and the consequent purchase of sets by a large number of Europeans in India. 
From 1934 onwards, when talk of further development of broadcasting accelerated still 
more; the total reaching 25,000 at the end of 1935, 38,000 at the end of 1936 and 50,000 
at the end of 1937.51 
 
 
The doubling of licence subscriptions within 12 months was considerable achievement 
given the Indian broadcasting environment in 1932 (which was far from dynamic). As 
Joselyn Zivin (1998) has rightly pointed out, though, the arrival of the Empire Service 
may have gained the ISBS a few extra subscribers, but it did little to broaden interest in 
radio broadcasting in India beyond its already elite listenership: 
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Aimed primarily at resident Europeans and conducted entirely in English, the Empire 
Service bolstered Anglophilic expectations for radio of the elite Indian subscribers, but 
did little to attract a broader band of India listeners.52 
 
Nonetheless, by the late 1930s (within the critical space of about eight years following 
the Empire Service’s inauguration) wireless broadcasting in India appears to have 
undergone a significant step change, and, at last, seemed to have found its evolutionary 
path from ‘infancy’ to ‘maturity’.53 By the years end of 1939 licence subscriptions 
totalled almost 74,000 – a tenfold increase over the 1932 figure. Listeners could hear 
programming redirected from transmitters located across the sub-continent; from 
Peshawar and Lahore in the Northwest Provinces, through Delhi and Lucknow (United 
Provinces), to Calcutta and Dacca in Bengal. Further south, shortwave (SW) and 
mediumwave (MW) transmissions from Bombay and Madras broadcast out over large 
sections of central and southern India with a radio network that catered for both urban 
and rural audiences (Figure 1). For all this development, though, India was still 
languishing behind its ‘Western’ counterparts: 54 
 
Compared with Western countries broadcasting in India is very backward. The closest 
parallel to India and Indian conditions in area, population, and variety of races, religions 
and languages is Russia. And Russia, which began to broadcast in earnest in 1926 has t-
day some 75 transmitters and 3 million receivers. Europe, excluding Russia, is the same 
size as India and has over 275 transmitters, with a total aerial power exceeding 6,000kW 
and 25 million receivers. 
 
 
Nonetheless, questionnaires issued to listeners suggested a significantly improved 
audience ‘reach’: 50% of licence-holders in Delhi, and 44% in Bombay, for example, 
listened to European oriented programming while 85% (an overwhelming majority) of 
respondents preferred listening to ‘Indian light’ and ‘Indian classical’ music. In the 
Bengal circle (incorporating Calcutta and Dacca) more precise figures are available. 
During 1939, 15,000 licence subscribers had been registered, 9,000 of who were Indians 
and 6,000 ‘Europeans’. In the Lahore circle, where this trend was even more marked, 
‘Europeans’ held only 22% of radio licences.55 More than that, however, listeners hadn’t 
just been linked into a system of national (Indian) broadcasting; they had also been 
integrated into the broader soundscape of Empire, through which the provinces, 
colonies, and dominions under the British flag could be brought closer to the imperial 
core.  
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Figure 1: India’s chain of Broadcasting Stations actual and prospective, and the areas covered (1937) 56 
 
These were noteworthy developments, particularly given broadcasting’s troubled infancy 
in India. And yet there is a problem here to be explained. When Lionel Fielden departed 
India in 1939 for a period of recuperation in the UK (having been Controller of 
broadcasting for almost 5 years, during which time Indian broadcasting had been 
provided a solid footing) he was not simply struggling with the effects of physical ill 
health. He had also grown deeply – even pathologically – disillusioned with the progress 
of Indian broadcasting and its treatment by the GoI. As he later recollected: 
 
Four years of hard labour had produced fourteen transmitters and a competent staff – 
and in four years the four hundred million people of India had bought exactly eighty 
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five thousand wireless sets. It was enough to make a cat laugh. It was the biggest flop of 
all time.57 
 
Fielden’s sense of failure and frustration wasn’t simply derived from such statistical 
considerations – or even from AIR’s distinct urban bias apparent from the 1937 
broadcasting map (see again Figure 1). His autobiography The Natural Bent (1960) stands 
as a broader account of what he regarded as the gross incompetence – and, at times, 
rank ‘stupidity’ – of the GoI in their failure to grasp the enormous political potentialities 
of radio during his term at the helm of Indian broadcasting. The period between 1935-
1940 (Fielden’s tenure) proved to be some of the most (geo)politically and socially 
turbulent of all the years of British history in India58 and yet, curiously, the government 
of India – the defenders of the ‘jewel in the British imperial crown’ – were unable, 
unprepared, or unwilling to utilise radio in either the service of empire or in the service 
of the Indian public.59 
 
The BBC, British India and Colonial Broadcasting 
 
“When, in 1927, I had managed to squeeze myself past the shaggy eyebrows of Mr 
Reith, and becoming a member of the BBC, Eric Dunstan, the ‘golden-voiced 
announcer’ of his day, was just leaving England to take charge of Indian broadcasting. I 
envied him in spite of the low value which we attached to broadcasting in those days. I 
envied him in India; I envied what I conceived to be the business of transmitting barbaric music on 
jewelled instruments to a population of Indian princes in the intervals of holding profound converse with 
sages of charm and infinite wisdom. In 1930 he was back, mortified, humiliated and enraged; 
and Indian broadcasting had gone bankrupt. This was a puzzle to me; and although I 
forgot about India in the breathless task of feeding the ever-hungrier microphone of 
Britain, it remained at the back of my mind, a puzzle which I intended to solve. And if 
one’s intentions are even moderately firm and consistent, they are often realized.”60 
 
The BBC’s (or rather Sir John Reith’s) interest in the question of broadcasting in India, 
which seems to have waned considerably during the ‘low years’ of the IBC/ISBS 
debacle, was substantially reinvigorated during the years 1932-1935. This was, at least in 
part, provoked by a somewhat tangential enquiry from Lord Lothian on behalf of the 
Marconi Company (2nd February 1932) regarding the technological feasibility of hand-
powered radio receiving equipment.61 Unbeknown to Lothian, his request for 
information was, in fact, propitiously timed – and resonated strongly with growing calls 
in ‘London circles’ for the re-examination of the previously neglected issue of 
broadcasting ‘in the Indian Village’.62 
 
C.F. Strickland (formerly an official in the Punjab) of the Indian Village Welfare 
Association wrote and lectured extensively on the subject in and around London during 
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1933/34, and evidently had some impact within the corridors of power. His writings 
seem to have been circulated widely in both London and Delhi, and were certainly 
known within the halls and broadcasting studios of the BBC, which republished his 
treatise on Broadcasting in Rural India in the Corporations’ 1934 yearbook: 
 
“The peasant of the Indian villages – 300,000,000 peasants in 700,000 villages – are 
industrious but simple, kindly yet inflammable, naturally intelligent but so depressed by 
the isolation and dullness of their surroundings that they seek relief in excessive 
expenditure on weddings and in futile litigation about nothing at all. The country and 
population are so huge that money and staff far in excess of what can be afforded would 
be necessary if schools, medical assistance, agricultural instruction, and recreation were 
to be spread throughout the rural areas in near future. 
 
The position would be entirely changed if those lonely masses could be advised, taught, and amused by 
means of broadcasting. Soviet Russia, finding itself in face of a somewhat similar problem, 
has installed countless receivers in schoolrooms or other accessible spots in villages, and 
conveys to people not only its own political propaganda but also a stream of genuine adult 
education. Weather news, market prices, agricultural advice, health advice, information 
about Russia and the world, culture and lighter items, all these enlarge and brighten the 
village, and mould the mind of the mujik. Is it not practicable to follow the same policy 
in India?63 
 
Strickland’s article is an important one, clearly stating as it does the underlying social 
and cultural – and even geographic, demographic and economic – issues that might be 
transformed by wireless broadcasting in rural India. It also invokes the spectre of Soviet 
Russia – and, significantly, propaganda broadcasting – as the model for the future of the 
Indian broadcasting experience.64 Speaking on the theme Broadcasting in the Indian Village 
in an address to the East India Association (London) Strickland developed this idea still 
further, suggesting that; “the most closely comparable example [to that of India] is that 
of Soviet Russia”.65 
 
[G]eographically, economically, and culturally India bears a resemblance in many 
respects to Soviet Russia. The Indian area is vast, the standard of living low, illiteracy 
widespread, and the culture of the rural population takes the form of folklore, religious 
stories, and familiar songs.66 
 
In such functional matters comparisons with the Soviet Union were not entirely 
inappropriate. After all India and Russia each covered vast geographical regions, the 
landscape occupied by predominantly illiterate populations clustered into villages. 
Agriculture was pursued on the same near-subsistence level and, as Zivin (1998) has 
noted on a rather more political level: 
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Like India’s colonial regime, the Soviet counterpart was faced with the challenge of 
disseminating messages of state to populations previously outside the elite range of 
reception.67 
 
More surprising than these synergies, though, was the way in which the proponents of 
rural broadcasting in India – in particular Strickland, but equally the BBC and other 
supporting institutions – were content to promote such Russian connections without 
any apparent unease at the coercive, propagandist nature of the Soviet model.68 While 
Strickland stressed that his rural broadcasting scheme would not permit listening to 
“undesirable foreign programmes” (in a clear reference to the Soviet programming of 
Radio Moscow), he was nevertheless prepared to see that same undesirable system 
replicated within British India.69 The BBC’s stance was no less contradictory, practicing 
(and evangelising) an editorially independent public service model at home while 
seeming to support proposals for government led propaganda in the colonies.70 But if 
this was a contradiction it wasn’t necessarily a new one. An internal BBC discussion 
document from 1927 (filed as Empire Service Policy) reveals very real concerns over the 
potency of Bolshevik propaganda, particularly to Empire audiences, and the need for 
the BBC to provide a determined riposte:71 
 
The continuance or destruction of civilisation will depend upon whether these very 
active Bolshevist propagandists fail or succeed in wrecking the established political 
system. The greatest political and moral stronghold in the world is the commonwealth 
of English-speaking peoples. If this can be held together it is unlikely that civilisation 
will succumb to the effects of those who desire its destruction. On the other hand, if it 
is allowed to disintegrate the influence of British ideals will become far less effective 
because those ideals will cease to be backed by power. The constitution of the civilised 
world may then become too weak to withstand the Bolshevic disease… This is a strong 
argument in favour of using every possible means of maintaining a consolidated British Empire.72 
 
This consolidation could be achieved, it was suggested, through a new service of direct 
communication between the institutions and peoples of the Empire. As the document 
concluded:  
 
It follows, therefore, that some consolidating influence is necessary, and it needs to be 
an influence which reaches every man, woman and child. The influence needed is not 
propaganda in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a means of intercourse which will bring about 
familiarity with the everyday affairs of Empire. This is where an Imperial Broadcasting Service 
will prove to be so valuable. It cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive interest in the 
affairs of Empire, and it will, to a very large extent, prevent the imperial ideal from being 
swamped by local nationalism.73 
 
The proposed Imperial Broadcasting Service wasn’t to be out-and-out propaganda in 
the Soviet sense, but a more subtle presence, quietly reinforcing the imperial ideal; the 
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Soviet model refined, perhaps, and made palatable to British tastes and traditions. 
Nonetheless, emerging nationalisms were still to be counteracted and foreign ideologies, 
particularly that of Soviet Russia, undermined. While Empire unity and familiarity were 
undoubtedly the central tenets of the IBS plan, they were very much promoted in 
defensive reaction to the perceived threats of Soviet ideological propaganda and 
emergent nationalist sentiment in the colonies and dominions.74 The BBC’s Empire 
Service (the inheritor of such IBS discussions) was not simply the product of 
sentimental visions of imperial hand-holding and “homely chats” to British ex-patriots, 
but, critically, was complicit in the geopolitical struggles and tensions that marked the 
twilight years of Empire. 
 
Nowhere was this role more obvious than in India where, as we have seen, the BBC’s 
influence stretched well beyond that of proprietor of Empire broadcasting. The 
corporation had selected Eric Dunstan to take charge of the fledgling IBC in 1926 
(following several representations by John Reith), and by 1933-4 were advancing the 
possibilities of rural/village broadcasting networks across the sub-continent.  At about 
the same time, John Reith was establishing direct contact with the Viceroy, H.E. Lord 
Willingdon, to promote the idea of reinvigorating Indian broadcasting at state level. 
Fortunately for Reith’s ambitions (and surprisingly, given the track record), Willingdon 
was much more amenable to the concept of wireless broadcasting than many of his 
predecessors – including, despite his warm words at the IBC’s inauguration, Lord Irwin 
– and agreed to take up the issue with the governing Executive Council. “You and I will 
pull this through”, he informed Reith in the summer of 1934.75 Pull it through he did. 
 
By September 1934, Willingdon was in a position to write to John Reith confirming 
definite progress and, following the tradition set by Dunstan’s secondment to the IBC 
in 1926, asking for his help in selecting an ‘expert’ for a five-year contract:76 
 
His role in the future development of broadcasting in India will be of the very greatest 
importance, and I hope you will help us to get the very best man available. I realise very 
clearly that the assistance and co-operation of the BBC will be invaluable to us, and I 
would like to have your goodwill at home supplemented out here by the guidance of 
one your best lieutenants…He will not have an easy task, but he will have a wonderful 
field to work in. He will need great tact, and a complete sympathy with the India point 
of view and with Indian aesthetic standards which may at first be strange to him. He will 
be brought into contact will all conditions of people and far greater variety than he 
meets in England, and will have to have the right word for each of them. Also, he will 
have to make the best at the outset of what may seem to him somewhat indifferent 
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material, for broadcasting in India has been starved in the past; and even in the future he 
must be content with a good deal of improvisation.77 
 
The Viceroy’s letter was read with some consternation by Home Department officials 
within both the Government of India (Delhi) and in the India Office in London.78 The 
GOI’s Director of Public Information, I.M. Stephens, was prepared to be ‘indiscreet’ on 
the subject in writing to his India Office counterpart, H. MacGregor. Contesting the 
Viceroys requirements, Stephens considered: 
 
“The man we need as our Controller of Broadcasting is someone with an adaptable 
mind, who is capable of feeling at home in India and being keenly interested in her 
problems, but we definitely want to avoid a man with ‘a complete sympathy with the 
Indian point of view’ as I fear this phrase might be interpreted in the BBC offices. 
Personally, I would prefer what might be described as ‘a concealed die-hard’.”79 
 
Whatever the official concerns in London and Delhi, its intended recipient received 
Willingdon’s letter with considerable excitement and anticipation. Reith’s reaction to the 
letter, which was dictated to him via the telephone to Capetown (where he was drafting 
a broadcasting constitution for the Union of South Africa80) makes for not only one of 
the most remarkable entries in his autobiography, but also a rather starling revelation in 
the history of British broadcasting. Reith’s immediate reaction wasn’t to delegate the 
role, but to attend to it himself: 
 
I was indeed prepared to meet this appeal. So convinced that broadcasting might be the 
determining factor in the future of India – the integrator – as to feel that perhaps I 
ought to go there myself; and for good. Indicated this to Whitely on the telephone from 
the Cape. No; he was sure it was my greater duty to stay at home, especially with the 
government inquiry about the BBC next year; I must see them through that. So I 
thought no more about it. More truthfully, I have thought about it many times since; 
and wondered.81 
 
The fact that Reith had considered, however briefly, leaving the BBC to accept the 
mantle of Indian broadcasting is clearly a significant point of note. Even more 
noteworthy, however, was the justification he offered for this near overwhelming 
conviction, in particular his brief that broadcasting could be the ‘determining factor’ in 
the future of India; “the integrator”, presumably of religions, of castes, of distant 
villages and urban centres, possibly even of coloniser and colonised.82 This certainly 
corresponded with Reith’s belief that if broadcasting had been taken seriously in 1924, 
“subsequent events in India might have been very different”.83 It also, though, exposes a 
latent innocence – even naivety – over the real potentialities of the wireless medium of 
influencing attitudes and human behaviour that prevailed during the 1920s/30s. The 
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growing reach of Radio Moscow and organised Soviet programming, along with the rise 
of Nazi radio propaganda (and its implication in the Saarland plebiscite of 1935) 
dramatically heightened conceptions of ‘radio power’ causing many national 
governments (and broadcasting institutions) to attach more importance to propaganda 
than it warranted.84  Viewed with hindsight, over seventy years later, it seems likely that 
Reith’s immediate reaction to the Vice-Regal communiqué was similarly coloured.85 
Nevertheless, Willingdon had unquestionably broken radio’s deadlock in India; had 
proposed high ideals in the way forward and called upon a ‘superman’ to see the vision 
through.  
 
The ‘superman’ chosen from the ranks of the BBC was Lionel Fielden; “brilliant but 
impetuous…[o]ne of those very highly imaginative, creative individuals whom the BBC 
was sometimes alleged to look on with disfavour.”86 Nonetheless, as Reith recognised; 
“The loss to the BBC was such, on this occasion and many similar occasions, as it was a 
duty to incur.”87 For Fielden, though, his selection was the resolution of a longstanding 
ambition, which had been sparked in 1926 by Eric Dunstan’s departure for the 
subcontinent.88 It was clear that Fielden would require sizeable authority (as well as 
imagination and creativity) to see through the Reith/Willingdon proposal – an authority 
that could only be granted through a revision to the Government of India Bill presently 
undergoing parliamentary review. This constitutional settlement, itself, represented a 
new vision for the future of the British administration in India. Longstanding notions of 
all-India unity, already being challenged by burgeoning nationalist movements, were to 
be refocused in the promotion of ‘provincial autonomy’ within a federated system of 
government.89 In this way, provincialisation might also “deflect all-India challenges to 
British authority”.90  
 
In broadcasting, too, the provinces were to have “almost complete autonomy” with 
only technical aspects being preserved under central control.91 Again, it was down to 
Reith and the BBC to impress the British model on the Government of India, and urge 
hasty reconsideration: 
 
In the following March the Secretary of State moved an amendment to the India bill to 
have broadcasting reserved for control at the centre; the decision, he said, had been 
made after consultation from the Government of India, the provincial Governments 
and the BBC. Though the provinces were have considerable latitude in programmes, 
broadcasting was to be a federal subject; policy would be controlled from the centre, 
with the Viceroy holding the balance.92 
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The path had thus been cleared for a centralised approach to Indian broadcasting with 
authority, again, vested in the Industries and Labour department (following the status-
quo established in 1930). It was made clear to Reith, after a series of discussions with 
the India Office, that there was no prospect of a self-governing corporation on the 
model of the BBC, although there was still the outstanding promise of BBC 
intervention in the shape of Lionel Fielden as Controller of Broadcasting.93 Unbeknown 
to Fielden, the BBC or the Viceroy, however, in clearing the way for an all-India 
approach to wireless, the government had already laid the foundation-stones for the 
hurdles and frustrations that would define only the following five years. As Fielden later 
reflected, this was, “an adventure that would end in explosion”94. The touch-paper had, 
it would seem, been ignited long before Fielden set foot on Indian soil.  
 
‘A clumsy title’: All India Radio and the ‘fantasy’ of Sonic India. 
 
The beginning of the telegraph in India [in 1852] illustrates the key problems involved in 
the transfer of a European technology to a colony. First, a person of reputation in the 
basic understanding of the project under consideration is needed. Preferably, this person 
should be an experienced colonial in order to have the authority of an on-the-spot 
observer. Such a person must not only be technically competent, but must have an 
enthusiastic vision of the benefits to be derived from the completed work, as well as the 
ability to express his views in a forceful and persuasive manner. Additionally, this person 
must be capable of making all necessary adaptations. He need not be an inventor or 
innovator, but he must be able to visualise the performance of the home technology in a 
foreign environment. He should realise that it is never possible to import a technological 
system into an undeveloped area without making some significant changes.95 
 
Reith almost certainly hoped that Lionel Fielden would live up to the same high 
standards and expectations that had defined Sir William O’Shaughnessy’s considerable 
achievements with the electric telegraph during the 1850s. It is clear, though, from the 
correspondence sent between the Director General and his appointed ‘superman’ prior 
to his departure for India that, while hopes were undoubtedly high, expectations were 
rather more guarded:  
 
You certainly realized the supreme responsibility which is committed to you, and what 
you have it in your power to do. I don’t know that anyone – not excluding the Viceroy – 
can do for India what you can…Don’t mind my urging you again to tread like Agag – very 
delicately – and to be wary. Perhaps the less you say the better for many months to come. I 
know what it will be – the suffering of fools, to say the least; but one gets that in every 
walk of life and it is always hard for men, like you, of quick intelligence and eager 
disposition. Impatience and such qualities are gifts of the Gods and they’re also 
instruments of the devil.96 
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Fielden was undoubtedly eager to the point of impatience. His autobiography is 
testament to the ruptures that developed between himself, as Controller of 
Broadcasting, the Government of India and the Indian Civil Service (ICS), each of 
whom he regarded as devoid of ‘decency and initiative’. “India,” Fielden recorded, “was 
a Paradise for those who were willing to sell the pass in the sense of supporting, over 
numerous whiskies-and-sodas, an imperialist oligarchy which was as dead as a dodo, and 
failing to realize that the real Britain might be a close friend to the real India”.97 The wireless, 
as the BBC’s empire service had illustrated, could be engaged in creating and sustaining 
such a dialogue. Indian radio could do the same and become – perhaps not the great 
“integrator” of Reith’s imagination – but a unifying influence with an ‘All-India 
Personality’ nonetheless.98 These questions of ‘radio power’ and ‘influence’, along with 
the impending prospect of war and propaganda broadcasting, dominated Fielden’s 
tenure of Indian broadcasting, exposing contradictions in government thinking and 
legislation.99 
 
Fielden, for all his impatience, quickly learnt a form of pragmatism regarding the 
broadcasting landscape he had entered. Even before embarking for India his perceived 
notions for Indian broadcasting had been forced to undergo rapid revaluation. The 
trigger was paradoxically the very government legislation that had brought his new role 
into existence. “I despaired quite a lot over the Government of India Act…It was too 
like the BBC, faces in the Tube, pinstripe trousers; not a flicker of humanity in its august 
pages.” He continued:  
 
Painstakingly I searched for a reference to broadcasting; for surely, I thought, as 
problem after problem was unfolded, examined, and placed on its appropriate shelf, 
surely, in this immense, sprawling, illiterate country, broadcasting could educate, unify, 
and direct as no other medium could. The spoken word could run like fire once again 
through India. But the grey volumes said no, we don’t deal in fire, and we don’t like new 
things; our findings are based on a careful study of the status-quo and how it can be 
maintained without upsetting Imperial traditions in these upsetting days when natives 
have the face to object to being called natives, and we actually have to change the name 
of Imperial Delhi, which we built with twenty million pounds of good Indian money, 
and call it New Delhi. So don’t, said the grey volumes, talk about broadcasting and 
unity, because unity, except as a pious aspiration, is a dangerous thing; and that’s just 
why the benevolent British Raj finds all these problems so very difficult to solve. 100 
 
This exposes some of the internal contradictions at the heart of the 1935 constitutional 
settlement. Provincialisation, after all, had been (in the crudest terms) designed as a 
policy of ‘divide and rule’, redirecting national loyalties and ambitions towards more 
mundane (i.e. less threatening) regional-level discussion. That broadcasting had been set 
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apart from this process and had found its way into the hands of someone like Fielden 
only escalated the latent fears within the GoI and ICS with regard to its ‘unifying’ 
properties. Indeed, in a curious political and ideological u-turn, the very same ‘great 
opportunities’ identified by Lord Irwin in 1927 (i.e. social, educational development, and 
mass entertainment)101 were, by the mid-1930s, seen as ‘great dangers’ within the Indian 
administration. As Jocelyn Zivin (1999) has recognised: 
 
The very instrument of modernity that Fielden brought with him posed great dangers to 
imperial prerogatives. The distances that broadcasting could cover and the boundaries it 
could transgress, the mass society which it was expected to cultivate, and the novel 
expertise it demanded (from outsiders like Fielden) all violated what little was left of the 
‘Imperial idea’.102 
 
Fielden did little to appease these brewing concerns. This became particularly obvious 
(not least to GoI members) following an unscheduled, although not necessarily 
unplanned, encounter between the Controller of Broadcasting and the Viceroy, Lord 
Linlithgow.103 
 
Fielden had long been troubled by the title ISBS (Indian State Broadcasting Service) and 
had sought a re-designation that would lend Indian broadcasting the ‘all-India 
personality’ he desired.104 The Secretariat, though, rejected his choice of ‘All India Radio’ 
out of hand and thought ISBS perfectly serviceable. Unusually, this seemed only to 
inspire, “a little unnatural tact” in the customarily impetuous Director of Broadcasting. 
By the end of the meeting, not only did Fielden have the name change he desired, but 
seems also to have persuaded Linlithgow that the idea had come from the Vice-Regal 
imagination: 
 
I cornered Lord Linlithgow after a Viceregal banquet, and said plaintively that I was in 
great difficulty and needed his advice. (He usually responded well to such an opening). I 
said I was sure that he agreed with me that the ISBS was a clumsy title. After a slight 
pause, he nodded his long head wisely. Yes, it was rather a mouthful. I said that it was 
perhaps a pity to use the word broadcasting at all, since all Indians had to say 
‘broadcasting’ – broad for them was an unpronounceable word. But I could not, I said, 
think of another title; could he help me? ‘Indian State’, I said was a term which, as he 
knew, hardly fitted into the 1935 Act. It should be something general. He rose 
beautifully to the bait, ‘All India’? I expressed my astonishment and admiration. The 
very thing. But surely not ‘Broadcasting’? After some thought he suggested ‘Radio’? 
Splendid, I said – and what beautiful initials’. The Viceroy concluded that he had invented 
it, and their was no more trouble. His pet name must be adopted. Thus All India Radio 
was born.105 
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Figure 2.  AIR Call Card (1948), illustrating AIR logo and regional stations/transmitters.106 
 
While Fielden had successfully secured a new identity for Indian broadcasting, the tug 
of war between AIR and the ICS only escalated in 1936. A set of strict editorial ground 
rules (quickly established between the Home Department and Industries & Labour) 
attempted to wrest control over the broad issue of AIR’s news service, particularly on 
their most controversial of radio issues – political broadcasting and ‘broadcast talks’. 
Government servants would, for example, be allowed to talk about their work, but – 
critically – had to avoid lapsing into matters of Propaganda.107 Political talks on the 
other hand had to be closely censored and all discussions maintained within ‘reasonable 
bounds’. ‘Violent controversies’ were to be avoided, and the political parties were 
banned from making any use of the news service. In addition, the GoI also undertook 
‘not to use the service for political purposes’.108 
  
AIR’s news broadcasting was thus systematically depoliticised in terms of overt political 
content. India’s political parties (i.e. Gandhi/Nehru’s Congress) had been prohibited 
from engaging in ‘potentially subversive’ transmissions, and even the most balanced of 
political debates on the radio. Curiously, though, in their race to grasp the nettle of 
political sedition, the GoI also seem to have legislated away much of their own ability 
(and that of its ‘servants’) to communicate with the Indian public - as it, too, had been 
inscribed into new editorial procedures. 
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As one might expect, the government’s interventions provoked censure from the 
Controller of Broadcasting, who had hoped to encourage radio’s political engagement 
with listeners in India’s regional languages.109 Fielden found tacit support for his cause 
back in London. This was heightened still further when, during the campaigns for 
provincial assembly elections in 1937, Maurice Hallett (Home Member) imposed a 
blanket ban on all broadcasting with political content, fearing, it would seem, the rapid 
re-nationalisation of provincial politics.110 The Undersecretary of State for India (in the 
India Office), R. A. Butler, viewed this decision with some notable disquiet: 
 
I can see the force of the arguments in Mr Hallett’s letter to Mr Fielden but would have 
thought it possible for one leader from each main political or communal group in a 
Province to use the wireless in much the same way as our political leaders do here…the 
theory that they might ‘disseminate sedition’ seems to show a misapprehension of the 
objects of the new Constitution which, among others, are to encourage Indians to blackguard 
each other (as we do in politics at home) and not us as a nation.111 
 
Hallett’s somewhat paranoiac mistrust of broadcasting had exposed a significant rift 
between the Government of India and the India Office, and had effectively ruled 
political discourse out of Indian broadcasting in the near term. In fact, Hallett’s editorial 
principles were to stand, guiding the GoI’s policy on broadcasting until India’s 
independence in 1947. Fielden’s belief in his broadcasting project, and British rule in 
India more broadly, had meanwhile been profoundly shaken by his official encounters, 
and he quickly began to struggle with the effects of misery and frustration.112 Isolated 
from civil service circles, and fearing that his own staff were informing on him, he 
sought support and reassurance from two rather unexpected sources; the leading lights 
of Congress, Mohandas Ghandi and Jawaharlal Nehru.113 
 
This is not to attempt a biography of Fielden’s life in India, but to expose some of the 
ruptures that had developed within the administrative hierarchies of Indian broadcasting 
during the late 1930s.114 Nehru’s reply to this cry for help encapsulates the situation.  
 
Your letter reached me and it made painful reading. I am afraid you are a misfit in that 
job or in India: but then all of us are. What is one to do about it? You blame others 
including innocent me but does not the fault lie really in the environment, in 
circumstances which are bigger than individuals, in the unhealthy relation between India 
and England, in the topsy-turvy world itself? Broadcasting is a great thing, I believe in it. But it 
is after all a part of a much larger whole, and if the body is sick how can you treat a finger or a limb?115 
 
Given Fielden’s increasing animosity towards the GoI – apparent in several self-penned 
(but anonymous) and highly critical articles published in The Times (London) along with 
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a high presence in India’s nationalist publications (for which he received an official letter 
of censure) – it would be easy to imagine that Fielden parted India with a final 
condemnatory ‘bang’. The reality was, in the event, rather less climactic. With his health 
deteriorating steadily during the summer of 1939, Fielden returned to London on 
medical leave, and while he returned briefly to India later in 1940 his term fizzled out 
with rather less political venom than it had started.116  
 
Conclusions 
 
Lionel Fielden’s experiences, and those of Indian broadcasting more generally since the 
1920s, provide a vivid sense of the inherent challenges in developing new forms of 
social and cultural communication in late-colonial India. While the subcontinent seemed 
to promise considerable ‘natural opportunities’ for the application of radio technologies 
and broadcasting practices, governmental inertia and official unwillingness to unsettle or 
undermine the Raj’s evolving constitutional/legal relationship with India (i.e. 
provincialisation and the Government of India Act) conspired to undermine radio’s 
commercial viability and, subsequently, its potential for an independent ‘public service’ 
role. Unbeknown at the time, these early decisions would have implications for radio’s 
future development in post-colonial India and post-partition South Asia – many of 
which are still being negotiated 60 years after Britain’s South Asian withdrawal. 
 
India’s ‘radio geopolitics’ equally exposed latent tensions – and competing 
priorities/aspirations – between the two chief branches of the Indian administration; the 
GoI’s reluctance to seize upon radio’s political potentialities in New Delhi, flying in the 
face of the perceived wisdom and experience – all too obvious in London – of India 
Office ministers and officials. Communications with the BBC and Sir John Reith 
expanded these important colonial (and personal) connections still further and gave rise 
to critical and not uncontroversial institutional (and even colonial) encounters between 
the Indian state broadcaster (ISBS/AIR) and the BBC, under both Eric Dunstan and 
Lionel Fielden. During Fielden’s tenure, in particular (and despite his nationalist 
sympathies), the structure and system of Indian broadcasting – and its connection with 
the BBC – was bitterly attacked and condemned as “the dumping ground for British 
refuse”.117 Radio was, thus, a thoroughly contested medium even if its potential was 
widely unrealised.  
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It would, though, be quite wrong to leave Fielden’s critical self-analysis of his tenure, 
and AIR’s development after 1935, unchallenged. By 1940, the “flop” of Fielden’s 
imagination, was a wide-ranging and professional system of colonial broadcasting, 
driven by 14 high-powered transmitting stations across the subcontinent, and 
transmitting in multiple languages and cultural traditions (by October 1940, news was 
broadcast in Tamil, Telugu, Gujerati, Marathi & Pashto).118 Fielden’s labour had, as 
Zivin (1999) has recognised, also produced the next generation of Indian broadcasters 
(including the future, and first, Director General of Radio Pakistan, Zulfaqar Bokhari) 
and in so doing had laid the groundwork – however politically compromised – for 
radio’s postcolonial, post-partition emergence. Thus, as this paper has sought to 
demonstrate, any account of the geopolitics of British-Indian radio has to be mindful 
not only of those personal and institutional networks and relationships but also 
generous in spirit to those early pioneers of broadcasting.  
 
Even with independence India’s radio systems struggled to live up to the high 
expectations laid out by the former Viceroy, Lord Irwin, in 1927. Indeed, the ‘special 
opportunities’ provided by India’s distances and vast open spaces would continue to 
prove a near unassailable financial and technical challenge until the dawn of the 
transistor revolution in the mid-1960s – at just the moment when South Asia’s airwaves 
were facing a renewed geopolitical struggle for Cold War cultural (and technological) 
superiority. As the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict would aptly demonstrate, AIR and Radio 
Pakistan faced fresh competition for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Indian subcontinent 
as the broadcasting triumvirate of Radio Moscow, Voice of America and the BBC 
World Service sought to (re)exert their aerial influence across the region.119  
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